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What Should the Restatement (Fourth) Say About
Treaty Interpretation?
Jean Galbraith*
ABSTRACT
The Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law took notably different approaches to treaty
interpretation, reflecting intervening changes in the legal landscape.
This symposium contribution identifies five developments in
international and domestic law since the Restatement (Third). It then
considers their import for the forthcoming Restatement (Fourth). Most
importantly, it argues that the Restatement (Fourth) should fully
incorporate two articles on treaty interpretation from the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties into its black-letter provisions. Since
the time of the Restatement (Third), these articles have become central
to international practice on treaty interpretation, and the principles
they set forth are broadly consistent with how the U.S. Supreme Court
approaches treaty interpretation. This contribution also suggests that the
Restatement (Fourth) soften the Restatement (Third)’s provisions on
deference to the executive branch in treaty interpretation. Finally, this
contribution notes the rising importance in foreign relations law of the
interpretation of legislation related to treaty implementation.

* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. For their helpful comments, I
thank the participants at the BYU Law Review symposium on Treaty Law and the
Restatement. I also thank Zach Smith and other editors of the BYU Law Review. A full draft of
this Article was written (and made publicly available) before the reporters of the Restatement
(Fourth) circulated their draft provision on treaty interpretation.
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At the end of the drafting of the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law, one observer joked that the Restatements
should be titled like serial westerns—“something like Restatement,
Return of the Restatement, Son of the Restatement, and the
Restatement Rides Again.” 1 As with all good analogies between law
and popular culture, this quip is ridiculous and yet somehow right.
To be sure, there is little of the lone rider in a Restatement. Instead,
each Restatement is the product of a byzantine institutional process
involving reporters, counselors, advisers, the ALI Council, and the
ALI membership, as the immense number of drafts will attest. But
the quip has a ring of truth. There is something undeniably heroic
about the Restatements. They tower over most other private
contributions to the understanding and the development of law.
With the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law now
on horse—though still far from the sunset—comes the scramble to
influence its course. Like others, I have a wish list. Mine includes as
narrow treatment as possible of some recent Supreme Court
decisions relating to treaties and an emphasis on process-based
flexibility for the political branches. 2 For purposes of this symposium,
however, I wish to focus on a single issue: the legal principles that
should govern the interpretation of treaties by U.S. courts.
Two core questions underlie treaty interpretation by U.S. courts.
First, what legal principles govern the interpretation of treaties?
Second, to what actors, if any, should deference be given with regard
to treaty interpretation? Each of these questions potentially has both
international and domestic legal dimensions. The Restatement
(Second) and Restatement (Third) both addressed these questions,
1. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Revised: How Were
the Controversies Resolved?, 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 180, 181 (1987) (remarks of
Professor Harold G. Maier). I have reluctantly decided not to adopt this naming convention.
Instead, I follow the American Law Institute in referring to the 1965 Restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law as Restatement (Second) and to the 1987 Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law as Restatement (Third)—a naming schema used despite the fact that there was
never a Restatement (First) of the Foreign Relations Law.
2. See Jean Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty-Implementing Power in Historical Practice, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 59 (2014) (demonstrating that long-standing historical practice
supports a congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement treaties);
Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 247 (2012) (arguing that
under certain conditions the Senate has the constitutional power to advise and consent to
treaties before they are finalized).

1500

2.GALBRAITH.AA (DO NOT DELETE)

1499

4/30/2016 5:37 PM

What Should the Restatement (Fourth) Say?

but, as I detail here, they did so against quite different backdrops
than are present today. Since the Restatement (Third) was finalized
in the mid-1980s, there have been shifts both in international law on
treaty interpretation and in U.S. domestic practice regarding treaty
interpretation. The Restatement (Fourth) should ideally structure its
provisions on treaty interpretation not only to reflect these
developments, but also to situate them analytically in ways that
further the “clarification and simplification of the law and its better
adaptation to social needs.” 3 I argue here that the most important
way to do so would be to incorporate the full text of Articles 31 and
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna
Convention”) into the black letter of Restatement (Fourth). In
addition, I offer some thoughts on how the Restatement (Fourth)
should approach the issues of deference and of the interpretation of
statutes related to the implementation of treaties.
I. HOW THE RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) AND (THIRD) DEALT WITH
TREATY INTERPRETATION
This Part describes the choices about treaty interpretation made
in the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) and sets them
in the context of the times in which these Restatements were drafted.
Doing so sets the stage for considering the prospects for change and
continuity in the future Restatement (Fourth).
A. Restatement (Second)
The original plan of study for the Restatement (Second) did not
include treaty interpretation among its topics. 4 It was quickly added,
but mainly because of an interest in the domestic legal question of
whether U.S. courts owed deference to the views of the executive

3. Certificate of Incorporation of the American Law Institute (Feb. 23, 1923),
https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/10/62/106284da-ddfe-4ff4-a698-0a47f268ee4c/
certificate-of-incorporation.pdf. Throughout this piece, I focus on U.S. courts as the
interpretive actors, but some of the analysis could also apply to executive branch actors
engaged in treaty making.
4. Am. Law Inst., Agenda for Discussion of Possible Work on Project in the Field of
Foreign Relations Law 3–5 (Mar. 1955) (describing four sub-issues for the planned treaty
section, none of which was interpretation). All primary sources cited from the drafting of the
Restatements, including this document, are available on Hein’s ALI database.
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branch. 5 By contrast, Reporter Adrian Fisher initially considered the
international law on treaty interpretation to be a topic on which the
Restatement would not add particular value. 6 As the project
developed, however, it came to encompass both international and
domestic legal considerations in relation to treaty interpretation.
As to the international legal principles of treaty interpretation,
Section 147(1) of the Restatement (Second) identified the overall aim
to be “ascertain[ing] and giv[ing] effect to the purpose of the
international agreement.” 7 It produced a list of nine factors “to be
taken [into] account by way of guidance” in doing so. 8 The first
factor was “the ordinary meaning of the words of the agreement in
the context in which they are used,” while the remaining eight
factors included the shared negotiating history, subsequent practice,
and other textual and background considerations. 9 Section 147(2)
then provided that while the first factor “must always be considered
as a factor in the interpretation of [an] agreement,” there was “no
established priority as between the [other factors] . . . or as between
them and additional factors not listed therein.” 10
The Restatement (Second) identified two additional domestic-law
factors that U.S. courts interpreting a treaty should use “for the
purpose of determining its effect as domestic law.” 11 The first was
relevant evidence from the U.S. negotiators and from the adviceand-consent process, regardless of whether this material was
communicated to other parties to the treaty. 12 The second factor was
the giving of “weight”—in fact “great weight”—to an interpretation
asserted by the executive branch “in the conduct of [U.S.] foreign

5. Am. Law Inst., Project for Work in the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
37–38 (1955).
6. Am. Law Inst., Transcript of Conference on Possible Project in Foreign Relations Law 20
(Mar. 31, 1955) (explaining that while some international legal issues, such as reservations, were
the “part of the wheel that seems to . . . be squeaking” and thus deserved treatment, treaty
interpretation seemed straightforward and its coverage would be “awfully black-letter-ish”).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 147(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. § 147(2).
11. Id. § 151.
12. Id. § 151(a) & cmt. b.
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relations.” 13 Commentary in a preliminary draft asked “[h]ow [m]uch
[w]eight [d]oes ‘[g]reat [w]eight’ [h]ave?” and observed bluntly that
“[t]horough-going realists might say that in actuality the ‘great
weight’ rule is merely a symbol of professional courtesy between
coordinate branches of government, or that it is a rationalization of
conclusions reached on other grounds.”14 The final commentary was
not so explicit, but it did remark that “the relative importance of the
weight to be accorded to the views of the executive branch and the
factors indicated in § 147 cannot be precisely stated.” 15
Several things are notable about the approach adopted by the
Restatement (Second). First, overall there is a strong preference for
flexibility over predictability in treaty interpretation. The invocation
of nine factors in Section 147 is the most obvious expression of this
preference, but it can also be found in the comment suggesting the
variable meaning of “great weight.” Second, the only institutional
deference identified—the deference due to the positions of the
executive branch—is to a domestic actor. The Restatement (Second)
is mostly silent about the prospect of deference to foreign or
international courts. As to foreign courts, the commentary
effectively treats their interpretations as an uninteresting species of
state practice, viewing their decisions as “no more conclusive
internationally than any other unilateral national interpretation such
as one by a foreign office or chief of state.” 16 As to international
courts, the Restatement (Second) notes that their interpretations can
bind internationally for a state that has previously consented to their
jurisdiction, but does not suggest deference in other circumstances. 17
Third, the Restatement (Second) treats evidence of the U.S. intent in
forming the treaty and deference to the executive branch’s
interpretation as important for U.S. courts engaged in treaty
interpretation because of treaties’ status as domestic law. By
conceptually separating the treaty’s status as international law from

13. Id. §§ 149, 151(b), 152.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 4.08 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 1959).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 152 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
16. Id. § 148 cmt. b.
17. Id. § 148(1).
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the treaty’s status as domestic law, the Restatement (Second) thus
justifies parochial moves that can further U.S. functional and
institutional values. But in the process it creates the odd potential of
a treaty provision having one meaning under international law and a
different meaning under domestic law. In the commentary, the
authors of the Restatement (Second) signal consciousness about the
awkwardness of their solution by noting that, in practice, courts and
agencies try to “avoid differences between the international and the
internal legal effects of international agreements.” 18
The Restatement (Second) was published in 1965. Just four years
later, the Vienna Convention was finalized. 19 During its negotiations,
the United States pushed hard for highly flexible clauses on treaty
interpretation, but the Vienna Convention ultimately adopted a
somewhat more focused approach. 20 Article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention provides that a treaty “shall be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.” 21
Among other additional provisions, it also states that there “shall be
taken into account . . . [a]ny subsequent agreement between the
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty [and] [a]ny
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.” 22 Article
32 provides that “[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the
meaning where the interpretation according to Article 31” is
ambiguous or manifestly absurd. 23 Taken together, Articles 31 and
32 cover much of the same ground as Section 147 of the
Restatement (Second), but they are not as free form. Among other
18. Id. § 151 cmt. a.
19. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
20. Julian Davis Mortenson, The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to
Drafting History?, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 780, 798–820 (2013) (providing a detailed account of
the negotiating history of Articles 31 and 32).
21. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 19, at 340.
22. Id. Another provision of Article 31 notes that “[a]ny relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties” should also be considered. Id.
23. Id.
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differences, they place a stronger emphasis on the treaty’s text and a
lesser weight on the negotiating history.
The United States signed the Vienna Convention in 1970.
Because of a disagreement between the president and the Senate
about an issue unrelated to Articles 31 and 32, the United States did
not ratify the treaty in the years that followed its signature. 24 To this
day, the treaty remains formally pending in the Senate’s advice and
consent process. 25
B. Restatement (Third)
The authors of the Restatement (Third) wrote their sections on
treaty interpretation against the backdrop of both the Restatement
(Second) and the Vienna Convention. One major choice for them,
therefore, was what to do when the two differed. Which should
they follow?
The first tentative draft forthrightly sided with the Vienna
Convention over Section 147 of the Restatement (Second) in its
proposed black-letter language. These proposed sections tracked
Vienna Convention Articles 31 and 32 word-for-word, except for
substituting the term “international agreement” for “treaty.” 26 The
draft commentary and reporters’ notes stated that the Vienna
Convention’s provisions were “somewhat different from the
approach ordinarily taken by courts in the United States” in that the
Vienna Convention placed more emphasis on text, and less on
purpose and on the drafting history. 27 This draft also concluded that
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention were too specific to
embody customary international law and observed that therefore,
since the United States had not ratified the Vienna Convention,
these articles “do not strictly govern interpretation by the United
States or by courts in the United States.” 28 Yet the tentative draft

24. Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United
States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 295–99 (1988) (describing this issue in depth).
25. Treaties Pending in the Senate, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Apr. 27, 2015),
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pending/.
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 329–330 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 1980).
27. Id. § 329 cmt. b.
28. Id. § 329 cmt. a.
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nonetheless decided to throw its lot in with the Vienna Convention
in describing the international legal principles, while retaining
additional sections on principles relevant for U.S. courts as they
interpret treaties as domestic law. 29
By contrast, the final draft opted for muddy waters. The blackletter provision on interpretation under international law—Section
325—offered only a partial endorsement of Vienna Convention
Article 31. It followed Article 31 in noting that interpretation should
be “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to [an international agreement’s] terms in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose.” 30 It then had a provision on
subsequent agreement and subsequent practice, but this provision
differed from Article 31 by indicating that subsequent practice was
relevant even if this practice did not establish the agreement of the
parties. 31 The black-letter provision did not include other parts of
Article 31 and made no reference to Article 32.
The comments and reporters’ notes revealed that fierce debates
lay beneath this black-letter brevity. Like the tentative draft, a
comment in the final draft concluded that the Vienna Convention’s
specific rules on treaty interpretation did not embody customary
international law and therefore did not currently bind U.S. courts. 32
The remaining comments and reporters’ notes then emphasized
ways in which U.S. practice differed from the Vienna Convention’s
approach. 33 These included that U.S. courts placed greater emphasis
on the negotiating history, that U.S. courts were more purposive in

29. See id. §§ 334–335.
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 325(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
31. Id. § 325(2); see also id. § 325 cmt. c.
32. Id. § 325 cmt. a.
33. The comments also observed that different interpretive approaches might be
appropriate for different types of treaties. Articles 31 and 32 do not say anything about this
explicitly but commentators have since read them to be compatible with this position. See, e.g.,
Catherine Brolmann, Specialized Rules of Treaty Interpretation: International Organizations, in
THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 507, 508–09 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012); Richard
Gardiner, The Vienna Convention Rules on Treaty Interpretation, in THE OXFORD GUIDE
TO TREATIES, supra, at 475, 504; Mark E. Villiger, The Rules on Interpretation: Misgivings,
Misunderstandings, Miscarriage? The ‘Crucible’ Intended by the International Law
Commission, in THE LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION 105, 122
(Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011).
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approach, and that overall U.S. courts were “generally more willing
than those of other states to look outside the instrument to
determine its meaning.” 34 In other words, the comments and notes
reiterated many of the positions taken by the United States during
the negotiation of the Vienna Convention. Taken all together, the
end result is one of studied ambiguity: one can find support in
Section 325 either for following the Vienna Convention or for
continuing the more free-form approach endorsed by the
Restatement (Second). 35
The Restatement (Third) mostly followed the Restatement
(Second) in concluding that U.S. courts should take into account
U.S. negotiating records and materials from the advice-and-consent
process and that U.S. courts should give “great weight” to executive
branch interpretations. 36 But there are some differences between the
Restatement (Second) and its successor. For example, the obligation
to take U.S. materials into special account was moved out of the
black-letter provisions, the “great weight” accorded to the president
is suggested to be strongest where the president’s interpretation is
made in communication with other countries, and the linkage
between these interpretive positions is tied not to a treaty’s status as
“domestic law” but rather to its status as “law in the United
States.” 37 But it is hard to tell if these differences were meant to be
meaningful substantive changes. The Restatement (Third) also
followed the Restatement (Second) in saying nothing particular about
deference to interpretive decisions by foreign courts, save for a line
in the reporters’ notes that “the interpretation of the agreement by
other nations, or by international tribunals in cases to which the
United States is not a party, will be given due weight.” 38
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 325 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also id. § 325 cmt. e & nn.1 & 4. One can
debate how accurately these assertions reflected U.S. case law at the time, but I do not
undertake that inquiry here.
35. Cf. John Parry, The Political Theory of Treaties in the Restatements of Foreign
Relations Law, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1581, 1618–19 (2016) (finding continuity between the
Restatement (Second)’s and the Restatement (Third)’s approaches to treaty interpretation).
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 326(2) & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also id. § 325 reporters’ note 5.
37. See generally id. §§ 325–326.
38. Id. § 325 reporters’ note 4 (adding that “such ‘foreign’ interpretations ordinarily
are not binding on the United States as a matter of international law and are therefore not
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II. CHANGES SINCE THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
Both the international and the domestic legal landscapes on
treaty interpretation have changed in important ways since the
Restatement (Third). This Part briefly describes five changes that I
see as important for purposes of evaluating what the Restatement
(Fourth) should say on treaty interpretation. I focus on describing
the changes that have developed rather than on assessing their
normative desirability.
First, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention are now
accepted as customary international law, even as the status of
customary international law as part of the law of the United States has
become more controversial. As noted, the Restatement (Third) did not
consider Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention to embody
customary international law. Today, however, there is a strong
consensus that Articles 31 and 32 do stand for customary
international law on treaty interpretation. 39 Indeed, the United
States takes this position in litigation before the International Court
of Justice. 40 Accordingly, it seems safe to treat Articles 31 and 32 as
applicable to the United States as a matter of customary
international law.
Yet in the years since the Restatement (Third), the status of
customary international law as federal law in the United States has
become more controversial. Scholars have taken a range of positions
on the issue and, at present, there is no clear consensus. 41
binding on United States courts”). The notes further observed that “The United States and its
courts and agencies, however, are bound by an interpretation of an agreement of the United
States by an international body authorized by the agreement to interpret it.” Id.
39. For discussion of this issue, see RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION
12–19 (2008). See also Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S.
Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 445–48 (2004) (collecting sources with a special
emphasis on U.S. courts).
40. Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 67–68 & n.142 (Nov. 3, 2003), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/128/10837.pdf (describing Article 31 as “an article reflecting customary international
law” and observing of Article 32 that “[t]his provision of the [Vienna Convention] likewise
reflects customary international law”).
41. Some of the many articles in this debate include Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About
Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L.
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Fortunately, this overall lack of clarity is mitigated on the particular
issue of treaty interpretation. Regardless of the extent to which
customary international law is part of federal law, there are good
reasons for federal courts to draw on shared international principles
in treaty interpretation. As the Supreme Court observed in a recent
case, “[i]t is our responsibility to read the treaty in a manner
consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties.” 42
Using the accepted international rules on treaty interpretation would
further the dispatch of this responsibility. In addition, given the
executive branch’s acceptance of Vienna Convention provisions like
Articles 31 and 32 as customary international law, “[p]erhaps not
surprisingly, therefore, courts sometimes invoke the [customary
international law] of [treaties] as embodied in the
Vienna Convention.” 43
Second, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have proved
more malleable in international legal practice than their language
might suggest. The final draft of the Restatement (Third) was
published in 1987, eighteen years after the drafting of the Vienna
Convention and only seven years after it entered into force. Since
that time, Articles 31 and 32 have mellowed with age. As Richard
Gardiner has put it, practice “reveal[s] a quite loose structure for
developing interpretations, rather than a straightjacket or formulaic
set of requirements.” 44 This flexibility is also emphasized in the work
of international bodies and individual scholars. As one example, the
International Law Commission’s current project on Treaties Over
Time defines subsequent practice as meaningful under the Vienna

REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as
Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); David H. Moore, An
Emerging Uniformity for International Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2006); Curtis A.
Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the
Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007); Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford
R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2009); Carlos M. Vázquez,
Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions
and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495 (2011).
42. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1233 (2014) (emphasis, citation, and
internal quotation marks omitted).
43. CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 160
(2013) (footnote and citation omitted).
44. Gardiner, supra note 33, at 492.
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Convention’s rules on interpretation even when this practice falls
short of clear agreement. 45 As another example, Julian Mortenson
has argued that the Vienna Convention is in fact fairly generous in
the extent to which it allows the drafting history to be used. 46 The
authors of the Restatement, however, read the Vienna Convention
narrowly on each of these issues and accordingly resisted its
authority. 47 Now that there is more support for reading Articles 31
and 32 broadly, concerns about their constraints should be reduced.
Third, U.S. courts now approach treaty interpretation in ways that
seem compatible with Articles 31 and 32. The last thirty years have
also brought developments in treaty interpretation in U.S. courts.
For better or worse, there has been a turn towards textualism in U.S.
statutory interpretation, eroding what the reporters of the
Restatement (Third) viewed as “the strong tendency in United States
case law to reject literal-minded interpretation of statutes.” 48 This
same turn has manifested itself in treaty interpretation. A 1988
Supreme Court decision explained that “[w]hen interpreting a
treaty, we begin with the text of the treaty and the context in which
the written words are used.” 49 The Court immediately qualified this

45. The International Law Commission’s current draft conclusions do this in two ways.
First, they do so in relation to Article 31(3), which speaks of “[a]ny subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 19, at 340. The draft
conclusions make clear that such agreement can be satisfied by active engagement by a varying
number of parties combined with “[s]ilence on the part of one or more parties . . . when the
circumstances call for some reaction.” Int’l Law Comm’n, Subsequent Agreements and
Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.833,
at Draft Conclusion 9 (2014), http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/L.833. Second,
the draft conclusions find that subsequent practice by a single party is a supplementary means
of interpretation for purposes of Article 32. Int’l Law Comm’n, Subsequent Agreements and
Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.813,
at Draft Conclusion 1(4) (2013), http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/L.813
(“Recourse may be had to other subsequent practice in the application of the treaty as a
supplementary means of interpretation under article 32.”); id. at Draft Conclusion 4(3) (observing
that “[o]ther subsequent practice” can be the conduct of “one or more parties” to the treaty).
46. See generally Mortenson, supra note 20.
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 325 cmts. c, e, g, & reporters’ note 4.
48. Id. § 325 reporters’ note 4.
49. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991) (using
this same language).
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remark, however, by noting that “[o]ther general rules of
construction may be brought to bear on difficult or ambiguous
passages” and “[t]reaties are construed more liberally than private
agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the
written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the
practical construction adopted by the parties.” 50 More recently, in
Abbott v. Abbott, the Supreme Court simply stated that “[t]he
interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins
with its text.” 51 It is hard to tell how much this proclaimed emphasis
on text affects the actual interpretive process engaged in by the
Court. Abbott itself drew upon many interpretive principles besides
text, including subsequent practice, evidence from the negotiations,
and the “objects and purposes” of the treaty. 52 And another more
recent case, Bond v. United States, downplayed text in favor of the
perceived purpose of the treaty at issue. 53
The overall picture is essentially one of convergence between
Articles 31 and 32 as interpreted over time and the Supreme Court’s
approach to treaty interpretation. Both emphasize text but make
room for many other interpretive principles as well. As one scholar
puts it, “at one time or another the Court has used every single
interpretive tool reflected in the Vienna Rules” and indeed
“consistently relies on the same interpretive tools.” 54 This similarity
is likely one rooted in the common imperatives of engaging in
50. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 486 U.S. at 700 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
51. 560 U.S. 1, 9 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Medellín v. Texas,
552 U.S. 491, 506–07 (2008) (using this same language but also noting that “we have also
considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as
the postratification understanding of signatory nations”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. 560 U.S. at 18–20 (not stating, however, how much weight it was giving the
evidence from the negotiating history, perhaps because of doubts about how objectively this
evidence reflected the negotiating history); see also infra note 63 and accompanying text
(noting Abbott’s use of deference to the executive branch).
53. 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014) (discussing the interpretation of the treaty in the
course of interpreting its implementing legislation, stating that despite “its broadly worded
definitions, we have doubts that a treaty about chemical weapons has anything to do with” an
individual assault that used chemicals and adding that there “is no reason to think the
sovereign nations that ratified the Convention were interested in anything like” such
individual assaults).
54. Roger P. Alford, Bond and the Vienna Rules, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1561
(2015); see also id. at 1566–70.
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interpretation rather than in direct causal ties. The Supreme Court
has paid little formal attention to Articles 31 and 32—or, for that
matter, to either Restatement with regard to treaty interpretation. To
date, no Supreme Court majority opinion has cited the Vienna
Convention Articles 31 or 32, and only two dissenting opinions have
done so. 55 One Supreme Court majority opinion does cite Section
325 of the Restatement (Third) for the proposition that “[a]n
international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 56 The Court
does not mention that this language is modeled off Article 31, but
the use of this language demonstrates that the Court is indeed
comfortable with the rule articulated in Article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention. This is consistent with the broader point that while the
Supreme Court shows no specific attachment to the Vienna
Convention’s provisions on treaty interpretation, it also shows no
particular hostility toward them. Instead, the Court mostly just
quotes its own precedent on the standards of interpretation which, as
mentioned, seems within the big tent of Articles 31 and 32.
Although the general principles of treaty interpretation have
converged, there remains the issue of how U.S. courts should deal
with what the Restatement (Second) identified as domestic-law
factors: first, deference to the executive branch and second, the

55. Abbott, 560 U.S. at 40 n.11 (2010) (Stevens, Thomas & Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
(citing Article 32 of the Vienna Convention in arguing that the focus should have been on the
plain language); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191, 194 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Articles 31 and 32 in chiding the majority for overemphasizing dubious evidence from the negotiating history at the expense of the ordinary
meaning of the text). Some lower court opinions do cite to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention. See Criddle, supra note 39, at 447 n.72 (giving examples).
56. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006). In addition, one majority
opinion of the Court has cited to Section 147 of the Restatement (Second). Trans World
Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 259 (1984) (citing in passing to the
Restatement (Second)’s inclusion of subsequent practice as a factor in treaty interpretation). As
best I can tell, Restatement provisions on treaty interpretations have been cited in only one
other case—in a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia. In this opinion, he attacks the position
taken in both the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement (Third) that U.S. courts can draw
on materials from the Senate advice and consent process in interpreting treaties, at least where
the text appears plain. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371–76 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that this approach “commits the United States to a form of interpretation
plainly out of step with international practice”).
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added importance of U.S. intent in forming the treaty as shown by
U.S. negotiating documents and evidence from the advice-andconsent process. I address the first point as a separate issue below. 57
As for the second point, my impression is that this issue has not
proved particularly important in practice, at least outside the context
of treaty self-execution, which I discuss as a separate issue below. 58
This may be because in practice evidence specific to internal U.S.
processes may rarely end up shedding light on contested issues of
treaty interpretation before U.S. courts. In United States v. Stuart,
for example, the Court did discuss this evidence but only for the
purpose of observing that it shed no light on the specific issue in the
case. 59 The importance of this issue may be further diminished
because, as discussed below, 60 the domestic law that courts are directly
applying is often treaty-implementing legislation rather than treaties.
Fourth, the picture with respect to deference reflects some modest
changes since the Restatement (Third). Current doctrine with respect
to deference to the executive branch is hard to characterize with
confidence. In an important survey of the issue, Robert Chesney
suggests that “the high-water mark for the deference doctrine in its
formal aspect” came with the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc v. Avagliano 61—a few years before the
Restatement (Third) was completed. Yet the Supreme Court and
lower courts do frequently continue to invoke the principle of
deference and, when they do so, they usually interpret the treaty in
line with the executive branch’s position (although it is hard to know
how causal the executive branch position is to the outcome). 62 In
Abbott v. Abbott, for example, the Court invoked the “great weight”
doctrine over the dissenting view of Justices Stevens, Thomas, and

57. See infra Section III.B.
58. See infra Section III.C.
59. 489 U.S. at 366–67. As noted supra note 56, Justice Scalia objected to this
interpretive consideration.
60. See infra Section III.C.
61. Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive
Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1749 (2007).
62. See id. at 1754–58 (reviewing published federal court decisions from 1984 to 2007
that invoke the concept of deference and finding that the executive branch position usually
prevails in these cases, but noting that he only reviewed cases “in which the courts engaged,
more or less directly, the deference doctrine”).
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Breyer that the doctrine was inappropriate where the executive
branch had “no unique vantage” on the issue. 63 But in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld the Supreme Court declined to even mention the “great
weight” standard as it ruled against the executive branch on a point
of treaty interpretation, even as Justice Thomas chided it in a dissent
joined by Justice Scalia for not “acknowledging its duty to defer to
the President.” 64 More recently, in BG Group PLC v. Republic of
Argentina, the Court simply said that “we respect the Government’s
views about the proper interpretation of treaties” and then
disregarded those views. 65 In short, although the “great weight”
standard continues to be frequently invoked, one cannot confidently
predict that a court will in fact give great weight to the views of the
executive branch on treaty interpretation. 66
Besides deference to the executive branch, the Supreme Court
sometimes notes deference to treaty interpretations by foreign
courts. As mentioned earlier, both the Restatement (Second) and the
Restatement (Third) appear to view foreign court decisions as
relevant only as state subsequent practice (unless they are directly
binding decisions by international tribunals). The Supreme Court
has indeed embraced foreign court decisions as evidence of state
practice. In Abbott v. Abbott, the Court observed that in
“interpreting any treaty, the opinions of our sister signatories are
entitled to considerable weight” 67 and then went on at some length
to discuss court decisions in other jurisdictions. 68 Something notable
about Abbott—and about other cases in which the Court has looked
to the practice of other states—is how much the Court focuses on
the decisions of individual foreign courts as distinct from statements

63. 560 U.S. 1, 15 (2010); see also id. at 41–43 (Stevens, Thomas & Breyer,
JJ., dissenting).
64. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 619–32 (2006); see also id. at 718–19
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1209 (2014).
66. Harlan Grant Cohen, The Death of Deference and the Domestication of Treaty Law,
2015 BYU L. REV. 1467, 1471–83 (2016) (discussing the deference trends of the Supreme
Court in more detail).
67. Abbott, 560 U.S. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted) (using this broad
language even though, in addition, the accompanying statute emphasized the importance of
uniformity in interpretation).
68. Id. at 16–18.
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or positions taken by individual legislative or executive branches. 69 At
the least, foreign court decisions appear to be the favored markers of
state practice for the Supreme Court; at the most, one could say that
there seems to be a level of deference that at least sometimes
transcends the category of state practice. In addition, the Supreme
Court has expressed a willingness, albeit a distinctly lukewarm one,
to give “respectful consideration to the interpretation of an
international treaty rendered by an international court with
jurisdiction to interpret such.” 70 Taken all together, the Court seems
to place special emphasis on the appropriateness of looking to
foreign court decisions in treaty interpretation.
Finally, U.S. practice on treaty implementation has developed in
ways that are relevant to treaty interpretation. Since the time of the
Restatement (Third), issues involving treaty implementation in the
United States have received considerable attention. Two issues in
particular relate to treaty interpretation.
One issue has to do with whether or not a treaty is selfexecuting. According to Medellín v. Texas, whether a treaty is selfexecuting in the United States is primarily a matter of treaty
interpretation. 71 Yet there is an important disconnect between this
69. Id.; Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1233 (2014) (noting foreign
court decisions in interpreting the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of Child Abduction,
although without expressly discussing the level of weight given to them); El Al Israel Airlines,
Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 173–76 & n.16 (1999) (heavily emphasizing a
decision from the highest court of England and Wales under the Warsaw Convention and
noting other foreign cases as well); E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 550–51 (1991)
(giving weight to an Israeli Supreme Court decision regarding the Warsaw Convention but
concluding that this weight was outweighed by factors favoring a different interpretation); see
also Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1238–39 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that not only is the
executive branch’s position “entitled to great weight,” but “[s]o, too, is the interpretation of
the courts of our sister signatories” and discussing several foreign decisions); Olympic Airways
v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should
have interpreted the Warsaw Convention differently in light of appellate court decisions in two
of the many signatories to the Warsaw Convention).
70. Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam). Compare Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 334 (2006) (reiterating this standard but noting that it “cannot
overcome the plain import” of the treaty provision at issue), with id. at 382–90 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority was far too stingy in how it applied
“respectful consideration”).
71. 552 U.S. 491, 506–07 (2008). But see id. at 541 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing
that prior Supreme Court precedent on self-execution is more important than a treaty’s
particular text on this issue).
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matter of treaty interpretation and most matters of treaty
interpretation. Unlike typical treaty interpretation, the question of
self-execution or non-self-execution is ultimately a matter only of
U.S. domestic law, not also of international law. 72 Although Medellín
describes principles of treaty interpretation using language from prior
cases engaged in typical treaty interpretation, 73 the Court approaches
the issue of whether the relevant article of the U.N. Charter is selfexecuting in ways that show the distinctness of this issue. Most
notably, it emphasizes background principles of foreign relations law
and how, in its view, these would have affected the way the Senate
perceived the treaty in giving its advice and consent. 74 In practice
then, as well as conceptually, the issue of self-execution is not on all
fours with typical treaty interpretation.
The other issue has to do with the increased prominence of
statutes related to the implementation of treaties. John Coyle has
coined the phrase “incorporative statutes” to describe statutes that
implement non-self-executing treaties, facilitate the implementation
of self-executing treaties, or approve and implement congressionalexecutive agreements. 75 These kinds of statutes have long existed, 76
but in recent years they have increasingly become the focus of
specific consideration by the Supreme Court. 77 In the last few years,
for example, the Court decided Abbott v. Abbott 78 and Lozano v.
Montoya Alvarez, 79 interpreting the Hague Convention on Civil
Aspects of Child Abduction in conjunction with its facilitating

72. See David Sloss, Taming Madison’s Monster: How to Fix Self-Execution Doctrine,
2015 BYU L. REV. 1691, 1708 (2016) (discussing Medellín and the one-step versus the twostep analysis, both of which contain one step that is exclusively a domestic-law analysis).
73. 552 U.S. at 506–07. In addition, Medellín discusses the practices of other nations,
although it does not explain precisely why this practice sheds light on what is ultimately an
issue of U.S. domestic law.
74. E.g., id. at 508, 510–11; see also id. at 515–16.
75. John F. Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L
L. 655, 666–68 (2010) (discussing these three types of statutes).
76. See Galbraith, supra note 2, at 89–104 (noting some early examples).
77. See Coyle, supra note 75, at 681–85, 692–94 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
treatment of incorporative statutes in some cases in the 1980s and 1990s).
78. 560 U.S. 1 (2010).
79. 134 S. Ct. 1224 (2014).
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legislation, 80 and Bond v. United States, 81 interpreting the legislation
implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention. In these cases, the
Court offers some signals on the interpretation of incorporative statutes,
although these signals do not all line up perfectly with each other.
Consistent with earlier Supreme Court practice, 82 Abbott,
Lozano, and Bond all suggest that the meaning of the underlying
treaties is important for the interpretation of the incorporative
statutes. For Abbott and Lozano, this follows obviously from the text
of the facilitating statute. 83 Bond is more equivocal on this issue, and
at one point the Court says, “[W]e have no need to interpret the
scope of the Convention in this case.” 84 Yet actions speak louder
than words, for the Court spends a great deal of effort in describing
and interpreting the Chemical Weapons Convention itself. 85 As the
Court puts it, the legislation “exists to implement the Convention, [and]
so we begin with that international agreement.”86 In all three decisions,
therefore, the interpretation of the underlying treaty is important.87
80. In addition, the Court decided Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017 (2013), but that
case is less significant than the other two with regard to treaty interpretation. There are
differences between Abbott and Lozano in how they understand the relationship between the
treaty and the legislation. In Abbott, the Court seems to treat the treaty as operative through
the legislation but basically embodied in it, while in Lozano the Court takes care to indicate
that the legislation expressly states that it is “in addition to and not in lieu of the provisions of
the Convention.” 134 S. Ct. at 1233. These differences are perhaps due to the Court’s
heightened sensitivities to these issues in deciding Lozano while Bond was pending.
81. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
82. Coyle, supra note 75, at 681–85.
83. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1229 (noting that the legislation “instructs courts to
decide the case in accordance with the Convention”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
84. 134 S. Ct. at 2088.
85. See id. at 2083–85, 2087–88, 2093. The Court not only interprets the Convention
as likely not covering the use of chemicals in the individual assault at issue, id. at 2087, but also
interprets the Convention to allow implementation to be done through state rather than
federal legislation. Id. at 2087, 2093.
86. Id. at 2087. For a discussion of comparative practice in the United Kingdom on the
interpretation of treaty-implementing statutes, see Michael Waibel, Principles of Treaty
Interpretation: Developed for and Applied by National Courts? 13–14 (Univ. of Cambridge
Faculty of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 16/2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2595681.
87. It would further seem logical for the Court to interpret these underlying treaties in
line with its general approach to treaty interpretation. In fact, there is considerable variation
between Abbott, Lozano, and Bond in how they approach treaty interpretation and principles of
deference. Regarding deference to the executive branch, for example, Abbott uses the “great
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These decisions differ, however, in how they reconcile tensions
between the underlying treaties and principles of U.S. domestic law.
Abbott does not seem to implicate such tensions, but both Lozano
and Bond do. In Lozano, the Court considered whether equitable
tolling applied to the treaty and its facilitating legislation where (1)
the United States has a presumption in statutory interpretation in
favor of equitable tolling of a statute of limitations but (2) other
parties to the treaty lack a similar presumption. 88 The Court
emphasized that “[e]ven if a background principle is relevant to the
interpretation of federal statutes, it has no proper role in the
interpretation of treaties unless that principle is shared by the parties
to an agreement among sovereign powers.” 89 The Court accordingly
interpreted the treaty not to require equitable tolling. It then went
on to effectively hold that the facilitating legislation did not require
tolling either. 90 In Bond, by contrast, the Court held that “in this
curious case” it was appropriate to apply a federalism canon to the
interpretation of the implementing statute—even though, depending
on the scope of the treaty, this might make the implementing
legislation cover less conduct than was covered by the parallel
language in the treaty. 91 Notably, the Court made this novel move
weight” standard while Lozano and Bond say nothing about deference (and differ in their
conclusions from the executive branch). Nonetheless, it seems likely that these differences are
unrelated to the role played by the incorporative statutes. To the extent that the Court does
give “great weight” to the executive branch on the interpretation of the treaty, the principle
that the interpretation of the treaty is relevant for the interpretation of the incorporative statute
will make the executive branch’s position of significance to the interpretation of the
incorporative statute as well.
88. See 134 S. Ct. at 1232–33.
89. Id. at 1233.
90. See id. The Court framed this discussion in terms of the facilitating statute not
“altering our understanding of the treaty itself.” Id. For there to be no equitable tolling,
however, the facilitating statute would also need to not provide for it implicitly, despite the
background presumption in American law that equitable tolling is available. The Court thus
effectively concluded that the facilitating statute did not impliedly allow for tolling. See id.
(noting that this statute “does not address the availability of equitable tolling”).
91. See 134 S. Ct. at 2090. For a critique of this approach, see Edward T. Swaine,
Bond’s Breaches, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2015) (noting that this approach
raised the “risk of jeopardizing U.S. compliance with its international obligations, contrary
to constitutional principles designed to reduce that risk”). David Moore, by contrast,
suggests that U.S. federalism principles should be used even in interpreting treaties
themselves. David H. Moore, Treaties and the Presumption Against Preemption, 2015 BYU
L. REV. 1555, 1578–79 (2016).
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against the backdrop conclusions that the treaty was “agnostic”
about whether enforcement was done at the federal or state level and
additionally that all U.S. states had laws to cover the conduct at issue. 92
Between them, Lozano and Bond demonstrate how tensions can be
found even between cases decided in the same term by the Court.
III. THE RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) AND TREATY INTERPRETATION
Now the Restatement rides again—but on different terrain from
its predecessors. So what should the Restatement (Fourth) do about
treaty interpretation? The most important change I recommend is
heavier reliance on Articles 31 and 32. In addition, ideally the
Restatement (Fourth) should make some tweaks to the Restatement
(Third)’s approach to deference and address the interpretation of
implementing legislation. 93
A. Articles 31 and 32 as Black Letter
In the last thirty years, Articles 31 and 32 have become a
cornerstone of international treaty practice and have been read
broadly enough to leave treaty interpreters with considerable
discretion. Instead of tracking the Restatement (Third)’s half-hearted
endorsement, the Restatement (Fourth) should fully embrace these
articles. The full text of Articles 31 and 32 should appear in the black
letter of whatever provision replaces Section 325 of the Restatement
(Third). Indeed, if it is compatible with the overall editorial choices,
the black letter should ideally not only repeat the text of Articles 31
and 32, but explicitly name these articles as the legal framework
governing treaty interpretation.
92. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087, 2092.
93. This Article was drafted and circulated before the reporters of the Restatement
(Fourth) circulated their draft provision on treaty interpretation. Although I thus will not
comment in detail on this provision, I think it is an excellent one. Broadly speaking, the draft
provision takes the approach that I advocate here with respect to Articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 106 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015)
(incorporating almost the entire text of Articles 31 and 32 into the black-letter provision). The
draft provision also takes an approach similar to the one that I advocate with respect to
deference, providing in the black letter that U.S. courts “will ordinarily give great weight to an
interpretation by the executive branch.” Id.; see also infra Section III.B (advocating the use of
“will typically give great weight”).
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This approach would have considerable benefits. As discussed
earlier, the principles of treaty interpretation applied by the Supreme
Court are essentially those of the Vienna Convention, particularly
since the Convention is taken to be a “quite loose structure . . .
rather than a straightjacket.” 94 By incorporating Articles 31 and 32,
the Restatement (Fourth) would accurately set forth what is not only
customary international law on treaty interpretation, but also
explicitly recognized by the United States to be so.
Incorporating Articles 31 and 32 would also provide a set of
principles that are not only clear and simple, but also better than
other options. One such other option might be simply to set forth
some language about treaty interpretation used by the Supreme
Court. But this would immediately raise the question of which
language, as the Court uses different phrases in different cases
without signaling that it has a single, carefully thought-out formula.
(Indeed, one phrase on treaty interpretation offered by the Court is
already the language of Article 31(1), as set forth in the Restatement
(Third)). 95 Rather than privileging the choice of language made in
some particular Supreme Court cases over other cases, the
Restatement (Fourth) would do better to use the internationally
accepted rules on treaty interpretation.
Setting forth the full text of Articles 31 and 32 is also better than
picking and choosing. Regardless of whether it was a good choice at
the time for the Restatement (Third) to set forth only part of Article
31, rewrite another part of Article 31, and take up all other issues in
an ambivalent set of comments and reporters’ notes, it would be a
poor one today. International practice has come to read the rules in
Articles 31 and 32 broadly enough that there is no particular need to
rewrite them for U.S. courts. For example, the International Law
Commission’s developing recognition that subsequent practice of a
single state can be a supplementary form of treaty interpretation
under Article 32 mostly addresses the concern that the authors of
the Restatement (Third) had with how the Vienna Convention
approached subsequent practice. 96 By giving the rules in full, the
Restatement (Fourth) would accurately reflect customary international
94.
95.
96.
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law and also avoid the difficulties of having to determine and justify
which aspects of the rules are most important in practice.
Although Articles 31 and 32 are long, their full inclusion makes
particular sense because of how important the issue of treaty
interpretation is. Unlike many other issues related to treaties, treaty
interpretation comes up in almost every case involving a treaty.
Articles 31 and 32 accordingly get used by courts far more than
most other provisions of the Convention. 97 Of course, to say they
get used is not to say that they have a powerful effect in channeling
actual treaty interpretation. Indeed, the broadening understanding
of their meaning may reflect the fact that the Vienna Convention
“governs in part by not governing—or, put more precisely, achieves
widespread compliance partly by deliberately declining to prioritize
effectiveness.” 98 Yet widespread acceptance of Articles 31 and 32 has
the advantage of focusing the attention of interpreters on the act of
interpretation rather than on its meta-principles. Their inclusion in
the black letter of the Restatement (Fourth) would also be a valuable
affirmation of the importance that international legal principles
should have to U.S. courts in interpreting international law.
My suggestions for the comments and reporters’ notes follow
straightforwardly from my earlier analysis. I think these should (a)
note that Articles 31 and 32 as interpreted are expansive enough to
cover how U.S. courts approach treaty-making, (b) note that Articles
31 and 32 now reflect customary international law, (c) pragmatically
recognize that Articles 31 and 32 set forth the appropriate rules of
decision for U.S. courts while leaving vague exactly why this is the
case (in order to dodge the broader debate of the role of customary
international law in U.S. law), (d) briefly acknowledge that U.S.
courts can further take into account specific evidence from the U.S.
negotiating process or the advice-and-consent process, (e) note that
U.S. courts may pay special attention to foreign courts both as
sources of subsequent practice and as actors whose views are worthy

97. For example, my search of federal court decisions on Westlaw between 2009 and
2014 revealed that Articles 31 or 32 are cited in at least eight of the twenty-five cases in which
at least one judge references the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. At least four of
these eight cases cite to Article 32.
98. Jean Galbraith, Book Review, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 859, 861 (2014) (reviewing THE
OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES, supra note 33).
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of respectful consideration, and (f) state that the issue of treaty selfexecution is sufficiently distinct from overall treaty interpretation that
it is covered elsewhere. A section along these lines would be of great
value in clarifying the foreign relations law of treaty interpretation.
B. Difficult Choices on Deference
A much harder question is how the Restatement (Fourth) should
characterize the issue of deference by U.S. courts to the executive
branch. Should it follow Restatement (Third)’s approach of stating in
the black letter that courts “will give great weight” and then qualifying
this though discussion of case law in the reporters’ notes? Or should it
soften the black letter—for example, “will typically give great weight”—
in addition to discussing case law in the reporters’ notes?
I think either of these approaches could effectively describe the
Supreme Court’s existing practice. From a descriptive perspective,
the important thing is to communicate that the Court usually (but
not always) says that it gives “great weight” to the views of the
executive branch and yet sometimes decides cases in ways that seem
inconsistent with substantial deference. In that sense, we may not be
too far off from the frank observation in the Restatement (Second)’s
preliminary draft that the “great weight” rule might in actuality be just
“a symbol of professional courtesy between coordinate branches of
government, or . . . a rationalization of conclusions reached on other
grounds.”99 But this can be expressed either through softening the
black letter or through building up the disclaimers that follow later.
Nonetheless, for normative reasons I favor the approach of
softening the black letter to something like “will typically give great
weight.” I think “will give great weight” implies a duty to defer,
while “will typically give great weight” implies a discretionary but
generally wise exercise of deference. This difference speaks to a
fundamental question of control—about whether courts defer to the
executive branch out of a duty to show respect for presidential power
in foreign affairs or instead out of a strong presumption that the
executive branch has particular judgment and expertise in these
matters. Where the interpretation of treaties is concerned—an area

99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 4.08 cmt. f (AM. LAW. INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 1959).
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where dubious interpretations by the executive branch could leave
the United States in violation of legal obligations owed to other
nations—I think it is better to characterize deference as a strong
presumption rather than a duty. 100
C. The Interpretation of Incorporative Statutes
A final issue is the interpretation of incorporative statutes.
Because of the increased attention this issue has gotten in practice, it
deserves some treatment in the Restatement (Fourth). It could
conceivably be its own section, but because it is a still emerging
issue, it seems to me that it would be best treated simply in a
comment or in a reporters’ note accompanying the main provision
on treaty interpretation.
An incorporative statute should be interpreted in light of the
underlying treaty (which itself will thus have to be interpreted). That
is both evident from Supreme Court case law and intuitively correct.
Less clear is how strong this interpretive canon is—and particularly
how strong it is when it conflicts with canons of statutory
construction in U.S. domestic law. Professor Coyle suggests that
“the court should read the incorporative statute to conform to the”
treaty as interpreted, “unless there is compelling evidence that
Congress intended a different result.” 101 This rule strikes me as
eminently sensible and consistent with the implicit approach of
Lozano and some earlier Supreme Court cases. But Bond takes a
different tack and accepts that U.S. federalism principles could justify
a gap between the interpretation of an incorporative statute and its
similarly-worded underlying treaty. It remains for future practice to
clarify whether Bond is a trendsetter or an outlier. Until then, the
best thing for the Restatement (Fourth) to do might be just to state
the obvious and note that courts can take different approaches in
interpreting incorporative statutes when there is a tension between
the interpretation of the treaty under international law and the usual
canons of statutory construction under domestic law.

100.
101.

For another discussion of this question, see Cohen, supra note 66, at 1487– 92.
Coyle, supra note 75, at 680.
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CONCLUSION
Reflecting on the drafting of the Restatement (Third), Associate
Reporter Detlav Vagts described how the reporters would first meet
to “thrash [a draft] out with a certain amount of blood shed on the
floor, usually at the Columbia Law School.” 102 They would then go
to the Advisers and have it be “picked over, carefully and in detail,”
then take it to the Council and have to “pick ourselves off the floor
after that,” and then take it to the ALI membership where “the floor
is somewhat of a bottleneck.” 103
Overall, the Restatement drafting process almost rivals the
complexity of multilateral treaty negotiations. And in Articles 31 and
32 of the Vienna Convention, we have already the product of an
exhaustive multilateral treaty negotiation—a product, moreover, that
has clearly weathered the test of time. Given the broad international
acceptance of these articles and their compatibility with the practice
of treaty interpretation in U.S. courts, their incorporation into the
black letter of the Restatement (Fourth) would be wise and might
even be unusually easy to do. Although less important, a softening of
the deference standard set out in the Restatement (Third) and some
discussion of incorporative statutes would also be valuable. I hope
the process will follow this course.

102. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Revised: How Were
the Controversies Resolved?, supra note 1, at 183 (remarks of Detlev Vagts).
103. Id.
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